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Abstract 
This paper aims to make sense of the rise of shadow banking in the context of the Chinese economic 
transformation to see if the regulator could avoid the hard-crash. Reportedly the estimated size of China's 
shadow banking system has reached to the level of equivalent to 36 percent of GDP as of the end of March 2013. 
But the emergence of systemic risk in accordance with the expansion of shadow banking in China does not seem 
to be a strong possibility, partly because even if the turmoil in the shadow banking occurs, commercial banks 
typically are not responsible for compensating customer losses so far as an effective firewall between 
commercial banking and shadow banking is constructed. Meanwhile, the information on who provides risk funds 
to the shadow banking system and on how the funds are used by ultimate users is still under the shadow of the 
system. This paper aims to make sense of the limited disclosure of information on shadow banking for the 
regulator to ease the so-called "audience effects", making time for the transformation to a new phase of post-
industrialization. 
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1. Introduction 
More researchers and scholars start shedding doubt on the sustainability of China's economic development. "The 
country’s whole way of doing business, the economic system that has driven three decades of incredible growth, 
has reached its limits. You could say that the Chinese model is about to hit its Great Wall, and the only question 
now is just how bad the crash will be" (Krugman 2013). The concept of kaifaqu (converting village land for 
industrial zones projects) lost momentum by the end of the 1990s and was unable to fulfill the task of effective 
accumulation for local governments. The small and scattered industrial establishments neither contributed to 
sustainable rural industrialization nor to local government finance (Hsing 2010). After that, new strategies were 
epitomized by xincheng (New City) projects at the urban fringe. Xincheng projects were carried out as mixed-
use real estate projects to build new urban space for commercial, residential, cultural, and administrative 
activities. Their success was measured by property value increases (Hsing 2010). However, it is reported that the 
rate of vacancy in the newly built commercial and residential condominiums has been increasing in some inland 
xincheng projects.  
As is argued later, intense regional competition under the decentralized political structure in the marginal areas is 
the key to understanding the extraordinary speed of market transformation in China during the 1990s and beyond. 
But the existing debate seems to understate how the non-state and hybrid sectors have been raising the necessary 
fund for their investment. Many researchers point out that informal finance sources in China, including "internal 
financing and trade credits, and coalitions of various forms among firms, investors, and local governments" 
(Allen et al. 2008) are far more important than formal sources1; especially for financing private enterprises, 
which have been the life-blood of rapid GDP growth (Allen et al. 2008, He 2005, Suzuki et al. 2008). In spite of 
it, the official data about the size of the overall informal or so-called "shadow banking" system in China have not 
been published. RIETI (2013) introduces the estimation of the size of China's shadow banking system by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to be 16.9 trillion yuan (equivalent to 36 percent of GDP) as of the end of 
March 2013, and by the Standard & Poor's (S&P) at 22.9 trillion yuan as of the end of 2012 based on a wider 
definition of shadow banking.  
This paper aims to make sense of the rise of shadow banking in the context of the Chinese economic 
transformation in order to see if the economic slowdown and the potential non-performing loans (NPL) in the 
shadow banking in China could cause a financial disaster, as well as to see if the regulator could avoid the hard-
crash. Section 2 aims to review the nature of financial products related to shadow banking system and to make 
sense of the rise of shadow banking in China. Section 3 aims to propose a fairly new hypothesis of explaining the 
limited disclosure of information on China's shadow banking, using the concept of "audience effects" from the 
regulator's perspective. Section 4 puts concluding comments.  
 
2. China's shadow banking 
What is China's shadow banking? To begin with, we define “indirect finance” and "direct finance". Indirect 
finance is defined as a system in which financial institutions basically absorb the borrowers’ default risk by 
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playing the role of intermediaries between households and firms where they lend to firms using the funds 
collected from households as deposits. On the other hand, direct finance is defined as a system in which the 
ultimate investors including households directly absorb the risk of default by purchasing primary securities 
(notes, stocks, corporate bonds, commercial papers etc.) issued by firms through the capital and securities market. 
Roughly speaking, the financial transactions in the "shadow banking" market in China are categorized into the 
activities of direct finance.   
At the fifth G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy held in November 2010, the participating 
countries agreed to ask the Financial Stability Board (FSB) for formulate proposals to strengthen the regulations 
and supervision for "shadow banking". In response to this request, the FSB published a background paper called 
"Shadow Banking: Scoping the issues" in April 2011. According to the FSB, shadow banking is defined as "the 
system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities (fully or partly) outside of the regular banking 
system" in a broad sense and as "credit intermediation by non-banks" in a more narrow sense. In Europe and the 
US, shadow banking generally means an investment management scheme, such as asset-backed commercial 
paper, conduits or structured investment vehicles, that employs excessive leverage to maintain margins by 
raising short-term funds and investing them in long-term assets (RIETI 2013).  
In the China Financial Stability Report 2013 published in May 2013, the People's Bank of China described the 
scope of shadow banking, referring to credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside of the regular 
banking system with the functions of liquidity and credit transformation, which could potentially cause systemic 
risks or regulatory arbitrage. The specific scope of shadow banking in China is not necessarily clear. However, a 
near-consensus has been reached such that the wealth management products2 and the trust products3 sold by 
banks and trust companies (purchases are mostly made by individual investors), respectively, comprise the core 
of shadow banking (RIETI 2013). These are the products in "direct finance" in a sense that banks do not assume 
the risk on their own, in general, given that the contract documents do not guarantee the principal or interest rates 
(however, bypass loans through trust companies to avoid regulations on real estate-related loans are considered 
to be a particular problem).  
In general, the funding source for borrowers, i.e. the flow of funds from savings (S) held by households as 
individual investors to investment (I) of the industrial sector, has two routes; First, the direct finance route in 
which the stocks or corporate bonds issued by firms or entities are purchased directly by investors through the 
capital and securities market (in case of China, some wealth management products are sold through commercial 
banks). Second, the indirect finance route in which banks as financial intermediaries play the role of collecting 
funds from households in the form of deposits and they then provide funds to the industrial sector in the form of 
loans. The most distinctive difference between direct finance and indirect finance lies in who undertakes the 
credit risk of the firms that borrow and use funds. In the indirect finance route, banks absorb the credit risk. Even 
if a borrower becomes bankrupt, the default does not directly affect any deposit contract between the bank and 
households as depositors. In contrast, in the direct finance route, the credit risk of the firms which issue their 
stocks and bonds is absorbed directly by the households as purchasers and holders of these securities, even if 
these securities are sold through securities brokers and investment banks (typically in the US) which play the 
role of intermediaries in the capital and securities market. For example, when an issuer becomes bankrupt, the 
households holding these securities suffer the loss.  
How are the separate direct finance and indirect finance routes balanced (or not balanced) across the whole 
system in China? We consider the financial decisions of Chinese economic agents, using a simple general 
equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu which are represented in figure 1 (the general equilibrium model per se 
faces a serious limitation that is largely of its own making. The standard general equilibrium model assumes zero 
transaction costs of monitoring, but this makes it difficult to explain why banks as financial intermediaries exist 
at all. Here we use the model to help our understanding on the nature of China's shadow banking). Each type of 
agent is denoted by a particular subscript: f for firms or entities, h for households as individual investors, and b 
for banks (typically state-owned commercial banks or SOCB in China). The superscript “+” represents supply, 
and the superscript “-” represents demand. Besides, D represents deposits, L represents loans and B represents 
bonds (securities or the other form of direct finance) here. 
1) Savings (S) held by the households as individual investors are invested either in 
securities Bh (particularly wealth management / trust products) or deposits D+ .  
2) Investments (I) made by the firms or entities are financed either by the funds raised in 
the capital or shadow banking market Bf or loans from banks L-. 
3) Banks provide loans L+ to meet the demand of firms. Banks in turn collect the necessary 
funds either from the securities and capital market Bb (each bank as a firm can issue its stocks or 
corporate bonds) or deposits collected from households D-. 
4) In the capital and shadow banking market, the demand of firms Bf as well as that of 
banks Bb is balanced with the supply from the households Bh.  
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Figure 1: A general equilibrium model in direct and indirect financing in China (The author has based this upon 
Suzuki 2011, p. 20） 
 
In this model in which all agents are considered to behave competitively, each market clears;  
I = S (goods market） 
D+ = D-（deposit market） 
L+ = L-（credit market） 
Bh =Bf + Bb（capital and shadow banking market） 
It is clear that if there were zero monitoring costs the only possible general equilibrium would be one where all 
risk-adjusted interest rates are equal. Risk in such an economy would be due to nature, rather than due to the 
moral hazard problems that emerge as a result of costly monitoring. Household investors would therefore face 
the same risk regardless of whether they invested directly and carried out the costless monitoring themselves or 
indirectly through banks, leaving the bank to do the costless monitoring. However, in reality, each borrower has 
distinctive credit risks related to their type and the type of activity they engage in. Thus, investors face 
significant and borrower-specific information and monitoring costs for screening and monitoring this credit risk.  
It is said that delegating monitoring activities to banks can help to accumulate knowledge and skills for 
monitoring in banks as financial intermediaries, which further improves the financial intermediation of resources. 
Banks can perform a function as financial intermediaries because the monitoring costs faced by banks are very 
likely to be lower than the potential cost of monitoring by individuals. However, in case of China, SOCBs are 
expected to continuously support the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Their skewed loan portfolio may have lost 
them the opportunity to accumulate knowledge and skills for monitoring the firms in the hybrid sector.  
The most important regulatory objectives for any regulatory authority are (1) to maintain financial stability, in 
particular, to preserve the stability of the banking system by preventing contagious bank runs, and (2) to improve 
financial intermediation (mobilizing savings from surplus units and intermediation to investors in such a way 
that the friction of transaction costs and the inefficiencies of asymmetry of information are minimized), 
including in particular the acquisition and accumulation of skills and knowledge for credit risk management in 
the monitoring process.  
The Anglo-American financial system is characterized by a “division of work” and “specialization”. Both the 
credit (bank loans) market and the securities (bonds) market play important but clearly distinguished roles in the 
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US framework of corporate finance. For example, the credit market caters the short-term working capital 
requirements while the securities market mediates long-term funds for medium to long term investment. 
Financial and banking stability, on the one hand, is preserved by imposing tight regulations on the credit market, 
i.e. US commercial banks, and by constraining excess competition among the banks under a protective 
framework. On the other hand, the existence of a large and diversified base of investors who can absorb various 
risks and uncertainty in the securities market, that is, the market for bonds, stocks, securities and venture capital 
funds, results in stability in that market while regulators ensure sufficient information disclosure and prevent 
insider trading that could undermine confidence in these markets amongst small to medium scale investors. 
Regulators also aim to maintain competition among financial and informational intermediaries. The fairly free 
and competitive securities market intermediates a significant part of financial resources and maintains the 
dynamism of the economy by channeling these resources into corporations and through venture capital funds 
into new investments. 
In China, the rise of shadow banking has been complementing the function of commercial banks as financial 
intermediaries, which has been weaken due mainly to tightening monetary policy and banking regulations 
(RIETI 2013). Many researchers point out that formal financial intermediation does not play a significant role in 
the present-day Chinese economy. China's banking system as formal indirect financing route which is still 
mainly controlled by the four largest state-owned banks, and two domestic stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) as formal direct financing route, have not been 
effective in allocating resources to innovative potentials in the economy (Allen et al. 2008). 
China's quantitative easing policy (QEP) implemented since 2008 has pumped up the state sector. Most of the 
bank credits created by the 4-trillion yuan (about 576 billion USD) stimulus package were channeled into state-
owned enterprises and local governments. The state sector has grown on cheap credit at the expense of the 
private sector4. However, it is reported that the real economy started to face a shortage of funds in mid-2010 as 
monetary authorities shifted their policy to tightening (RIETI 2013). The imbalance between I (particularly in 
the real estate industry) and L+ has encouraged the financial platforms of local governments and SMEs to tap the 
shadow banking system. Also, RIETI (2013) points out that due to a severe banking regulation such as relatively 
high reserve requirement and severe loan-to-deposit ratio, commercial banks have come to use shadow banking 
as a tool for expanding lending in lieu of traditional channels in order to avoid regulations.  
As is referred in the introduction, the estimated size of China's shadow banking system has reached to the level 
of equivalent to 36 percent of GDP as of the end of March 2013. However, the information on who provides risk 
funds to the shadow banking system and on how the funds are used by ultimate users is still under the shadow of 
the system. 
 
3. Economic Slowdown and Control of Audience Effects 
Ronald Coase (Nobel laureate) and Ning Wang point out that China became capitalist, at least in a sense that 
China is no stranger to capitalism, while it was trying to modernize socialism. "This is the most unexpected 
aspect of the Chinese economic transformation. ... The story of China is the quintessence of what Adam 
Ferguson called 'the products of human action but not human design'. A Chinese proverb puts it more poetically: 
'flowers planted on purpose do not blossom; the willows no one cared for have grown into big trees offering 
ample shade'" (Coase and Wang, 2012). They shed an analytical light on their account of "marginal revolutions" 
showing that China's market transformation in the 1980s was primarily carried out by the non-state (and hybrid) 
sectors while the state-led reform failed to revitalize the state sector. They raise four marginal forces - private 
farming, township and village enterprises (TVE), individual entrepreneurship, and the Special Economic Zones - 
which pioneered in transforming the Chinese economy during the 1980s.  
These economic experiments enjoyed some political freedom as long as their presence was no longer perceived 
as a threat to socialism. "Once peasants and unemployed city dwellers were allowed the freedom to pursue 
private entrepreneurship, it did not take long for their endeavors to outshine the state sector and convince the 
pragmatic Chinese leaders to recognize these experiments as beneficial rather than inimical to socialism" (Coase 
and Wang 2012). They emphasize that China's decentralized political structure and intense regional competition 
in the 1990s and beyond arose as the most powerful driving force behind China's economic transformation. 
Since local government officials are ultimately appointed by Beijing based on the performance of the local 
economy, Chinese local governments run their jurisdiction - the province, city, country, town, and village - much 
like a business corporation (Coase and Wang 2012). In particular, the kaifaqu fever (kaifaqu were mainly 
industrial estates) of the 1990s reflected a highly decentralized pattern of industrialization in China's countryside 
(Hsing 2010). In addition to the incentive structure to governmental officials, the Chinese government still 
controls many important economic resources particularly bank loans. "Repetitive and duplicative investment is 
inevitable, and indeed, an essential part of the process. This has resulted in an erosion of economies of scale to 
capital due to its under-utilization, but has greatly accelerated and diffused industrialization, turning China into a 
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formidable workshop of the world in less than thirty years" (Coase and Wang 2012).  
Krugman (2013) points out the existence of huge amounts of "surplus labor" keeping wages low even as the 
economy growth richer, as an engine for China's economic growth. "Now, however, China has hit the 'Lewis 
point' — to put it crudely, it’s running out of surplus peasants" (Krugman 2013). Krugman points out that 
investment is now running into sharply diminishing returns and is going to drop drastically. On the contrary, 
RIETI (2013) insists that the emergence of systemic risk in accordance with the expansion of shadow banking in 
China does not seem to be a strong possibility, partly because (1) even if the turmoil in the shadow banking 
occurs, commercial banks typically are not responsible for compensating customer losses, and (2) as the 
financial condition of commercial banks is strong, if a loss is generated from shadow banking-related businesses, 
it can be covered with shareholder equity and asset impairment provisions.  
Unless an effective firewall between commercial banking and shadow banking (investment banking) is 
constructed, the former reason would be undermined. Unless the transferred NPLs into the asset management 
companies (AMC) are resolved, even though the NPL ratio in commercial banks has reduced to the level of 
below 1 percent, the latter reason would be undermined. However, the disclosure of the information related to 
these issues has been limited in China. 
The financial policy best suited to achieve financial stability has been controversial. As a key prescription for 
preventing crises, Eichengreen (1999) focuses on the “disclosure of information” that was expected to 
attenuate asymmetries of information among regulators, banks and borrowers, which would in turn 
strengthen “market discipline” and help policymakers to identify the need for corrective action 
(Eichengreen 1999). Many analysts would agree with his emphasis on promoting the disclosure of 
information. However, does the disclosure of information always help?  
Banking is an information intensive industry, which looks at the financial transactions, cash-flow history and 
ongoing credit relationships of a borrower. The intangible and tacit nature of much of the information relevant 
for assessing a borrower’s promise to repay makes it almost impossible to transmit all of this information in any 
simple way to markets or other lenders through codified signals. Thus, bank defaults and the systemic risk of 
potential contagious runs cannot be prevented and resolved by the ordinary auction market mechanism. 
Therefore, financial regulations and government intervention are critical in maintaining financial stability. 
Taking the specific nature of information in financial markets into consideration, how should the information 
pertinent for assessing the potential solvency or insolvency of banks be dealt with?  
In an interesting argument, in the context of the 1997 Asian banking crisis, Satyanath (1999) draws attention to 
the complexity and constraints in the unfettered disclosure of information  and argues that if banks are to 
disclose information through unreliable channels which expose the information to the public, particularly when 
they are on the verge of bankruptcy, they risks costly bank runs, whereas if they communicate such information 
to the government through private channels, the government can accommodate such information in devising the 
monetary policy without causing costly bank runs. 
Elster (2000), referring to Satyanath (1999), highlights the importance of reliability of private channels enabling 
the banks to inform the regulator without simultaneously informing the public. Such reliable and closed channels 
are very important for financial systems to make it possible to detect problems and trying to resolve problems of 
bank solvency before the bank actually becomes insolvent. The disclosure of information between regulators and 
banks would not always be efficacious as it is conditional on what Elster calls “audience effects” by which “one 
can impose costs on oneself by announcing publicly that one is going to quit, thus raising the stakes by adding 
shame and loss of prestige to the other costs of relapse” (Elster 2000). For example as Nishimura (1999) points 
out, in 1995, the Ministry of Finance of Japan announced that the amount of non-performing loans held by the 
Japanese banks had reached around 40 trillion yen, while it had been previously announced to be only around 13 
trillion yen. This was because of a change in the definition and scope of NPL to include not only loans where 
repayments had been suspended but also loans where interest rates has been reduced or exempted. In addition, 
the scope of the definition was extended to include not only the 21 major banks but also all the depository 
institutions. This disclosure per se was reasonable. However, as Nishimura (1999) points out, this sudden 
announcement triggered deeper public uncertainties over the disclosure process of the Ministry of Finance of 
Japan, consequently fuelling general public distrust in financial system. 
Needless to say, a protective structure between banks and banking regulators can also result in potential moral 
hazard problems. The regulatory structure has to keep banks as well as the regulators from abusing their power 
to their own advantage. How do financial systems deal with the above delicate relations? In the case of the US, 
although the role played by US banks is largely limited to short-term lending for working capital requirements, 
the regulators held to the traditional conservative strategy of enforcing tight capital adequacy requirements and 
disclosure rules on banks to prevent bank runs. This structure has limited the negative audience effect of 
disclosure of information related to the insolvency of banks, even when they occasionally occur. Although an 
affected bank may be insolvent, the macroeconomic impact would be limited, because the financial role played 
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by the US banks was quite limited in the structure, where the US banks were encouraged not to have large 
commitments and exposures to particular companies or groups.  
In the case of China, the regulator may still need to manage the increasing pressure on disclosure of information 
on the Chinese financial system to ease possibly higher economic and political risks due to audience effects, 
until the transformation to a new phase of the post-industrialization will be realized. As Coase and Wang (2012) 
point out, while Chinese manufacturing firms are globally competitive, most of them can only compete on price 
in the global market due to the advantage gained by low production costs; they are still struggling to provide new 
and better products. "Short on innovation and lacking their own distinctive products, many Chinese firms depend 
on ordered manufacturing - taking orders from overseas markets and selling them under foreign brand names" 
(Coase and Wang 2012). The central government of China has assigned a high priority within its industrial 
policy planning on developing a culture of innovation. The intent is to replace low-wage, resource-intensive 
manufacturing with high value-added production (US-CESRC 2012). Apparently, China still need time to 
prepare for the transformation to the post-industrialization stage.  
 
4. Concluding comments 
We take it as uncontroversial that the core objectives of banking regulation are to ensure financial stability and to 
promote sound financial intermediation. Banking regulation has to balance the task of maintaining and 
enhancing the roles of banks (lenders) as financial intermediaries and monitors for allocating financial resources, 
and that of preventing them from underwriting non-performing credits under conditions of uncertainty in credit 
risk assessments. At the same time, regulators have to prevent contagious runs through the policy for protection, 
without creating adverse incentives for banks that may lead to a failure of effective monitoring and moral hazard. 
Here, we should note that banking regulators, virtually in any type of financial structure, are very closely 
involved in the operation of banks, in order to retain the effective power to monitor and discipline them for 
regulatory purposes. As the Regulation economic school emphasizes, banking regulation is of capital importance 
because of its effect both on the behavior of bank managers and on the specific characteristics of the banking 
industry (Freixas and Rochet 1997). Indeed, more or less extensive banking regulation exists in virtually every 
country with a well-developed banking system.  
It is quite interesting that Coase and Wang point out the Chinese people with full of optimism, energy, creativity, 
and determination as the root cause of the miraculous rise of the Chinese economy. Private entrepreneurship was 
illegal before the economic reform, but now it has been recognized as a primary driver of the economy. 
Nonetheless, as they point out, private entrepreneurs still face many prejudices and adversities (Coase and Wang, 
2012). While keeping the people's optimism, energy and creativity, the Chinese regulator has to monitor and 
supervise both of commercial banking and shadow banking activities to ensure financial stability as well as to 
improve sound financial intermediation. This is a great and important challenge for China to transform its 
economy to a new phase of post-industrialization.  
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Notes 
Note 1. Throughout the period 1979-2004, while the share of budgetary funds was shrinking and that of domestic 
credit was rising, the most notable change was that the share of "all others" increased steadily and reached a high 
of more than 70 per cent of total fixed asset investment. He (2005) places the following components in this 
category: (1) funds raised from equity markets, domestic and abroad, by issuing debentures or stocks; (2) funds 
raised internally, either from undistributed profits or retained funds, for some special purposes; (3) funds raised 
from authorised surcharges such as "coal for oil" fees and airport construction duty; (4) funds raised from 
borrowing from non-financial firms and individuals; (5) funds raised from issuing debt/share certificates to 
employees; and (6) in collectively owned or private enterprises, funds raised from personal savings. 
Note 2. Wealth management products are asset management products sold by commercial banks. The minimum 
investment amount is generally 50,000 yuan, and the maturity period ranges from one month to one year. Wealth 
management products are mostly fixed income-type products that invest in the call market, government bonds, 
bank debentures, enterprise bonds, and the bills of the central bank etc. (RIETI 2013). 
Note 3. Trust products are asset management products sold by trust companies. The minimum investment 
amount is normally one million yuan. The maturity period is one year or more. The investment destination 
mainly includes government-led basic industry, the real estate industry (RIETI 2013). 
Note 4. In 2009, an unprecedented total of thirty-four Chinese firms (not including three from Hong Kong) were 
listed in the Fortune Global 500. Only one, however, was a private enterprise. In 2010, forty-two Chinese firms 
(not including four based in Hong Kong) made it to the Fortune Global 500, two of them being private (Coase 
and Wang, 2012). 
 
 
